ABSTRACT
THE ARBITRATOR SELECTION HYPOTHESIS
In California, as in many other states, most automobile accident litigation must first be tried by an arbitrator rather than by a jury. However, either side may request a jury trial if the litigant is not satisfied with the arbitrator decision. The jury is not informed that arbitration has taken place, let alone the outcome. However, if the judgment is not more favorable to the requesting party than the arbitration award, then the party requesting the trial must pay the arbitrator's fee and costs incurred after the request for a trial de novo is filed. Any member of the state bar and any active or retired judge may serve as an arbitrator. The arbitration administrator selects a short list of three arbitrators. The litigants must agree on one. 1 We argue that arbitrators who are not good predictors of jury outcomes will not be chosen to arbitrate. As a consequence, arbitration verdicts will look very similar to jury verdicts.
We label this "the arbitrator selection hypothesis."
The basic intuition behind the arbitrator selection hypothesis is as follows: 2 The objective of court imposed arbitration is to reduce the number of cases going to jury trial. If two arbitrators are unbiased predictors of the expected jury outcome (that is, their decisions on average are the same as jury decisions), then arbitration administrators and litigants would prefer the lower variance arbitrator. The lower the variance, the more weight that each litigant will put on the arbitrator's decision relative to her own independent estimate of the jury outcome, and the more likely that the differential in the litigants' expectations will be less than the cost of going to a jury trial. That is, the lower the arbitrator variance, the more informative the arbitrator's decision, and the more likely that the litigants will either accept the arbitrator verdict or settle afterwards, thereby avoiding a costly jury trial. 3 The arbitration administrator and the litigants would prefer to save on needless court costs, so they will choose the lower variance arbitrator. 1 Arbitration takes place on a less formal basis than an ordinary court trial. The rules of evidence are relaxed and the case is usually tried within three months. Arbitration is generally required when the amount in controversy does not exceed $50,000. For larger amounts, there is arbitration when both parties stipulate to a hearing. There is no limit on the amount that the arbitrator can award. There is some variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction on the particular details of the program. The judicial arbitrator is not at all similar to a mediator, whose job is to get both sides to compromise and come to an agreement in a dispute. 2 The formal argument is found in Appendix A. 3 Note that the litigants gain information about the jury outcome from the arbitrator's decision and not from knowledge of the arbitrator. This can readily be seen when the litigants have diffuse priors over the jury award. Then knowing that an arbitrator is an unbiased predictor of the jury outcome also yields a diffuse prior over the arbitrator decision. Once the arbitrator has made her decision, the litigants update their beliefs.
On the other hand, given two arbitrators with identical variances, but differing biases vis a vis jury decisions, the arbitrator decision may be accepted and the post-arbitration negotiation costs may be eliminated if the arbitrator decision is not too far away from the expected jury decision. So it may benefit one or both parties when a less biased arbitrator is chosen.
In a nutshell, arbitrators are chosen in the shadow of the potential jury outcome. Those who are hired will have reputations for making awards close to the jury award. Successful arbitrators will either knowingly try to emulate juries (and because of their experience as lawyers and ex-judges will be able to do so) or naturally have the same attitudes as the average jury does.
Thus, the competitive market for arbitrators implies that their decisions should be much more consistent with jury verdicts than would be the case if arbitrators were randomly chosen. 4 Even if the arbitrator selection hypothesis did not hold, we would expect that both juries and arbitrators would follow the broad dictates of the law and thus show some similarities. For example, other things being equal, we would expect that larger plaintiff medical bills would lead to greater awards; and other thing being equal, greater defendant recklessness in comparison to plaintiff recklessness would also lead to greater awards. These variables and their empirical counterparts will be discussed more thoroughly in the following section.
THE DATA
Our data is drawn from Jury Verdicts Weekly over a nine-year period. We concentrate our attention on traffic accidents involving automobiles, trucks, and/or buses (accidents involving motorcycles, pedestrians, or deaths are not included in our sample). Focusing on one type of case, rather than pooling across issues such as malpractice and breach of contract, reduces the 'noise' from extraneous differences in the cases. Traffic accidents were chosen because they are the most common civil jury case. Jury Verdicts Weekly asks lawyers from both sides to report various details of the case. The reports are then edited and published weekly. They cover such details as the JURY AWARD, the plaintiff's MEDICAL BILLS, and the ARBITRATOR AWARD when the case was previously tried by an arbitrator (variables used in estimation will 4 Labor economists (see Bloom and Cavanagh, 1986, and Ashenfelter, 1999 , for examples) have a model of arbitrator selection, but it is significantly different from the one presented here. Here arbitration takes place in the shadow of a jury trial; in the labor economist model, the arbitrator is the last in line. Here the litigants desire arbitrators that are low-variance unbiased estimators of the jury trial outcome; in contrast, unions and corporations choose unpredictable arbitrators who have not made choices significantly different from other arbitrators (the exchangeability hypothesis). If the labor arbitrator were predictable, choosing an arbitrator would be tantamount to settling. 5 be denoted by capitals). 5 Jury Verdicts Weekly's coverage of civil juries is very good. For example, they cover more than 85% of all jury verdicts in San Francisco. 6 California employs comparative negligence (this is the case for most other states as well).
The defendant pays the plaintiff an amount equal to the defendant's relative negligence times the amount of damage to the plaintiff. For example, if the plaintiff has suffered $100 in damages and the defendant was very negligent and the plaintiff was not at all negligent, then the plaintiff should be awarded $100; if the plaintiff and the defendant were equally negligent, then the plaintiff should be awarded $50.00. Our measure for relative negligence of the defendant is based on the following formula:
Jury Verdicts Weekly describe the facts of the case. A value of 3 was ascribed to DCULPABILITY if the defendant had been driving recklessly; a value of 1 if the defendant's driving was normal; and a value of 2 was assigned for something in between. A similar scheme was devised for PCULPABILITY. Thus if both litigants had a score of 2, then the defendant's RELNEG would equal 1/2. If both litigants had a score of 1, then RELNEG would again be 1/2. 7 A jury's or arbitrator's subjective estimate of the total damage should presumably be related to some objective measure of damage. Our objective measure of damage is MEDICAL.BILLS. Multiplying RELNEG times MEDICAL.BILLS, we get RELNEG.MED.
Hence RELNEG.MED is the empirical counterpart to the rule of comparative negligence which apportions the liability for the damage according to relative negligence. 5 Summary statistics are found in Table 3. 6 See Shanley and Peterson (1983) and Gross and Syverud (1991) . 7 The case description and assignment of numbers was done without reference to the jury or arbitrator decision. I use the word culpability instead of negligence to emphasize the fact that the DCULPABILITY numbers come from the description of the case rather than from the jury's determination of negligence. The jury's determination of the percent negligence was rarely reported and data for it was not collected.
In Appendix B, I consider some other ways of defining relative negligence. These alternative measures yield very similar results.
Of course, one could quibble with any definition of RELNEG. So it is important to note that with one or two exceptions, other empirical studies have no measure of RELNEG whatsoever which means that these studies are implicitly assuming that degree of defendant negligence is identical across cases.
Since MEDICAL.BILLS includes estimated future medical costs, disputes about the size of the MEDICAL.BILLS may arise. Letting DISPUTE = 1 if a dispute arises, and letting dispute = 0 if there is no dispute, a new variable RNG.MED.DISP = RELNEG.MED * DISPUTE was created. 8 Other things being equal, both juries and arbitrators should award less than otherwise when there is a dispute about the size of the medical bills.
Previous research suggested that juries award plaintiffs more when the defendant is a business or government. 9 In order to test the deep pockets hypothesis, the variable DCORP.RNG.MED was created. Letting DCORP = 1 if the defendant is a business or government, and letting DCORP = 0, otherwise, DCORP was multiplied times RELNEG.MED, creating the new variable DCORP.RNG.MED.
Other things being equal, one would expect that juries (and arbitrators) would extract less from a defendant with deep pockets when there was a DISPUTE over MEDICAL.BILLS. Therefore, the variable DC.RNG.MED.DISP = DCORP.RNG.MED * DISPUTE was also created.
THE ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND THEIR PARAMETER ESTIMATES
We are now ready to specify the underlying econometric model to be estimated. As is often the case, there is more than one possible way of specifying the model. We consider three versions here and several more in Appendix B. Fortunately, the results are very similar. The main reason for considering the various permutations is to show the robustness of the results and dispel the notion that still some other specification would make an important difference.
A. The basic jury award and arbitration award equations
The basic model econometric model is closely related to the presentation of the data in Section A.
(1) JAWARD = α 0 + α 1 RELNEG.MED + α 2 RNG.MED.DISP + α 3 DCORP.RNG.MED + α 4 DC.RNG.MED.DISP + υ α + ε α 7 ε α is the error term arising from the particular jury's idiosyncratic behavior. ε α has a mean equal to 0. υ α is the error term arising from factors observed by the jury but not by me.
Examples of such factors include documentation of the plaintiff's pain and suffering, the particular nature of the damages, and the plaintiff's and defendant's demeanor when testifying.
The reason for dividing the error term into two component parts will be made clear shortly.
Recall that RELNEG.MED is relative negligence times medical bills; it is our characterization of comparative negligence. Our a priori expectation is that juries will broadly follow the dictates of the law and award more to a plaintiff, the greater the defendant's relative negligence and the greater the damage to the plaintiff (where medical bills is the measure of damage). That is, our a priori expectation is that α 1 > 0. 10 Since RNG.MED.DISP = RELNEG.MED times DISPUTE, we expect that α 2 < 0 and that | α 2 | < α 1 . That is, the award will be less than otherwise if there is a DISPUTE over the medical bills, but the effect of a medical dispute will not so large that greater medical bills lead to a lower award.
Essentially, DCORP.RNG.MED measures the change in the AWARD when the defendant is a business firm or government (since we already have RELNEG.MED). My a priori expectation (based both on previous empirical work and casual reading of the newspapers) is that juries tend to award more to the plaintiff when the defendant has deep pockets (α 3 > 0). DC.RNG.MED.DISP = DCORP.RNG.MED * DISPUTE. The jury's inclination to empty "deep pockets" should be tempered when there is a DISPUTE. That is, I expect that α 4 < 0 and | α 4 | < α 3 .
I next consider the arbitration award equation:
(2) ARBAWARD = β 0 + β 1 RELNEG.MED + β 2 RNG.MED.DISP + β 3 DCORP.RNG.MED + β 4 DC.RNG.MED.DISP + υ β + θ β I expect that the coefficients of the variables have the same sign as the corresponding coefficients in the jury award equation. In accordance with the arbitrator selection theory, I entertain the stronger hypothesis that α 0 = β 0, α 1 = β 1 , and α 2 = β 2 . Now the theory of arbitrator 8 selection also suggests that α 3 = β 3 and α 4 = β 4 , but experience tells me otherwise. It is not uncommon for juries to really sock it to corporations in product liability, so I would expect juries to be more aggressive than arbitrators in emptying deep pockets, although arbitrators would still not be slouches in this regard. That is, my a priori expectation is that, α 3 > β 3 > 0 and α 3 + α 4 > β 3 + β 4 > 0. Of course, in testing these latter hypotheses, I will be testing the arbitrator selection hypothesis at the same time.
Both the jury and the arbitrator have information about the case that is not accessible to me. I have only a short summary of the case. The arbitrator and jury have access to much more information that becomes available through the trial itself (for example, the previously mentioned pain and suffering of the plaintiff may be presented as evidence in the trials). The arbitrator selection hypothesis suggests that the information would affect the arbitrator and the jury in the same way.
That is, υ α = υ β .
Therefore, one might want to consider using seemingly unrelated regression in simultaneously estimating both the jury and arbitrator award equations. Unfortunately, the set of independent variables is the same in both cases; so, seemingly unrelated regression techniques are of no use. Nevertheless, it would be nice to get a feel for the joint variability of the jury and arbitrator awards not accounted for by our present set of independent variables. Therefore, I also undertook the Recall that the expected jury award is R = P*A, where P is the defendant's relative negligence and A is the amount that the jury would award if the defendant's relative negligence were 100%. Instead of seeing R as the basic econometric equation, we can view R as the product of two underlying econometric equations --A(w) and P(z). Our econometric model of A(w) is:
And our econometric model of P(z) is:
where ν α , the error term, has a 0 mean and is independent of ε α and the other independent variables in the award equation.
We do not observe A(w) or P(z) separately but only their product, the jury award:
Where θ is a marker for all the terms involving ε α and ν α .
By a similar process we can derive the arbitration award equation.
The main difference between equations 1 and 2 and equations 5 and 6 is that RELNEG in equations 5 and 6 is substituted for the intercept terms in equations 1 and 2. I had two qualms about estimating such a model: (1) 
C. Accounting for a plaintiff verdict
In the main body of the paper, I regress award against the independent variables; I do not break the estimation down into two parts --the probability of a plaintiff verdict and the award given a plaintiff verdict. The rationale for this procedure is as follows: Under comparative negligence, greater relative negligence by the plaintiff reduces the award toward zero so there is no need to distinguish between a verdict in favor of a defendant and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. A change in the verdict from the former to the latter would not change the award (it would be 0 in either case). This is in contrast to a system of negligence with contributory negligence which in principal either awards full compensation for damages or nothing at all to the plaintiff. Under negligence with contributory negligence the plaintiff might have received a large award if the verdict had been in her favor, but did not because the verdict was in favor of the defendant. Such an outcome would have to be distinguished from the situation where the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff, but nevertheless the award was small because the harm was small. Under a regime of negligence with contributory negligence, a simple award regression (that including both defendant and plaintiff verdicts) would be inappropriate and other estimation techniques which account for the probability of a plaintiff verdict should be employed.
However, under comparative negligence, the award is not all or nothing because greater negligence by the plaintiff reduces the award toward 0; so that standard regression is appropriate.
In fact, in the data set there are numerous cases where the award is very small (less than $200) and in a few cases the plaintiff received nothing even though the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff.
Despite the above arguments, in Appendix B2, I consider other estimating techniques that account for the probability of a plaintiff verdict. These include estimating the award conditional on a plaintiff verdict, the simultaneous estimation of the probability of a plaintiff verdict and the award given a plaintiff verdict, the sample selection of trials into a plaintiff verdict, and a Tobit equation. In Table B2 , I report the estimated coefficients based on these other methods. What is most striking about these results is how similar they are to each other and the standard regression results reported in Table 1 .
D. Other variations
In Appendix B, I discuss other possible equations and estimating techniques, and then present the empirical estimates. These methods include using different measures of relative negligence and characterizing the model as a log equation. These variations yield very similar results.
REGRESSION RESULTS
We are now ready to look at our regression results. Recall that we use two different methods of estimating the jury and arbitration award equations (actually, we have two variations on two different equations). Looking at Table 1 , it is immediately apparent that the different methods of estimation produce very similar results --with one exception, the comparable coefficients are identical to one decimal point. Therefore, to avoid unnecessary detail when discussing particular coefficients, I will just refer to the first jury award and arbitration award equations (regressions 1 and 2).
A. Parameter estimates
Looking at Table 1 , in all of the equations the coefficient of RELNEG.MED is positive as predicted and statistically significant (the tables report the two-tailed test probabilities; the hypothesis concerning the coefficient of RELNEG.MED and most of our other hypotheses are one-tailed). Suppose that the defendant is not a corporation and there is no dispute about the medical bills. Looking at the first jury award equation, if the plaintiff and defendant have been equally careless, then RELNEG is 1/2 and the plaintiff can expect to receive 44 cents for each additional dollar in medical bills. If the defendant's relative negligence is 100%, then the plaintiff can expect $.88 for each extra $1.00 of medical bills. When the defendant does not have deep pockets, juries and arbitrators do not appear to compensate for pain and suffering.
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In comparison to a situation where there is no dispute, a dispute over the size of the medical bills should reduce the award. In all of the equations, the coefficient of RNG.MED.DISP is negative as predicted, but in none of the equations is it significantly less than zero (here again "P > |T|" should be divided by 2 so that the results are not so dismal as they first appear). Also in all of the equations, the absolute value of the coefficient of RNG.MED.DISP is less than the coefficient of RELNEG.MED as predicted.
In all of equations, the coefficient of DCORP.RNG.MED is positive as predicted and statistically significant, meaning that juries and arbitrators empty deep pockets. The coefficients are economically significant, as well. Consider the case where RELNEG = 1 and there is no dispute over medical bills. Looking at equation 1, when the defendant is not a business or government entity, the jury awards $.88 for every $1.00 medical bills; when the defendant is a business or government agency, then the jury awards $9.03 for every $1.00 of medical bills.
Arbitrators also empty deep pockets, but by not as much. When the defendant is a business of government agency, then the arbitrator awards $7.18 for each $1.00 of medical bills.
In all of the equations, the coefficient of DC.RNG.MED.DISP is negative as predicted and statistically highly significant. And in all of the equations, as predicted, the absolute value of the coefficient of DC.RNG.MED.DISP is less than the coefficient of RNG.MED.DISP and highly significant (all at the 0.0001 level). Thus, a dispute over the medical bills again lowers the amount awarded but not enough to cancel out the positive affect of medical bills on the amount awarded.
B. Consistency
Do different juries treat like cases alike? That is, are jury verdicts predictable or do awards depend on the vagaries of the particular jury? A similar set of questions can be asked about arbitrators.
A serious problem is that our data is inherently biased against a finding of consistent behavior by juries (or arbitrators). Obviously, our data does not account for all of the legally relevant variables. Therefore, juries and arbitrators are likely to appear more arbitrary than they are in fact and would appear if we had access to the data available to them. 11 Furthermore, it is the least predictable cases that are the most likely to go to trial. For an "open and shut" case, there will be little disagreement between the litigants about the trial outcome. Therefore, the case is likely to be settled out of court in order to avoid the extra cost of a trial. Since juries and arbitrators tend to try the unpredictable cases, they will appear to be less consistent than if all disputes ended in trial. This is an example of "case selectivity bias" because jury (arbitration) trials do not sample randomly from all disputes, rather they tend to select from those disputes in which the trial outcome is the least predictable. 12 Finally, the most inconsistent arbitrators (those with the highest variance) are the most likely to have their cases retried by a jury. Thus, the set of cases that are retried by a jury tends to select from high-variance arbitrators. 13 For all these reasons, juries and arbitrators will look much less consistent than they would if we had access to all the information they have and if all disputes, not just the subset of unpredictable cases, were tried.
A good measure of consistency is R-square. 64% of the variation in the jury award and 63% of the variation in the arbitration award is explained by the independent variables (including the residual from the other equation). Whether these numbers are signs of consistency or inconsistency is open to subjective judgment. However, in light of the fact that the least predictable cases go to trial, these numbers appear to me to indicate considerable consistency.
C. Comparing juries and arbitrators
Do arbitrators and juries dispense the same type of justice? The vague concept of justice can be operationalized by breaking it down into parts: the difference in the average award, the difference in the equation parameters, the difference in the percentage of plaintiff verdicts, and the difference in the unexplained variance.
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Perhaps the easiest way to see the difference between jury and arbitration verdicts is to create a new variable, jury award minus arbitration award, and regress it against our set of independent variables (RELNEG.MED, RNG.MED.DISP, DCORP.RNG.MED, and DC.RNG.MED.DISP). The results are reported in Table 2 .
If the arbitrator selection hypothesis worked to the fullest extent possible, then the hypothesis would predict that all of the coefficients (including the intercept) are 0, the average jury award minus arbitration award is equal to 0, and the correlation between the jury award and arbitration award is 100%. 14 Unfortunately, all of this makes the usual interpretation of the tests of significance misleading because both the average and standard deviation equal 0 when the arbitrator selection hypothesis is true. Typically, one tests the hypothesis that a variable (or coefficient) is equal to zero under the assumption that it has a strictly positive variance. The arbitrator selection hypothesis says that the variable JAWARD.MINUS.ARBAWARD should equal 0 and its standard deviation should equal 0; the hypothesis says nothing about the ratio of the average JAWARD.MINUS.ARBAWARD to its standard deviation. In particular, this ratio need not converge to 0 when both elements of the ratio converge to 0. To illustrate, the average jury award minus arbitration award is -$3,295. This is 1.6 standard deviations from 0 (with an 11% level of significance). Suppose that each observation were 1/100000 as large so that the average differential would be 3 cents. This would still be 1.6 standard deviations from 0 as the standard error would also be 1/100000 as large. The more effective the arbitrator selection hypothesis, the greater the simultaneous reduction in both the average JAWARD.MINUS.ARBAWARD and its standard deviation is likely to be. The variance of JAWARD.MINUS.ARBAWARD = the variance of JAWARD plus the variance of ARBAWARD minus twice the covariance of JAWARD and ARBAWARD. The problem arises because the covariance increases as the impact of arbitrator selection increases.
To overcome the problem posed in the preceding paragraph, I also treat the JAWARD and ARBAWARD as independent variables and find the difference between their means. In this case, the overall variance is just the sum of the variances, which does not go to 0 when the arbitrator selection hypothesis holds perfectly. This test is a legitimate test of the arbitrator selection hypothesis. With this method, the difference between the JAWARD and ARBAWARD means is 0.74 standard deviations, which produces a significance level of 47%. So this evidence does not reject the arbitrator selection hypothesis. 15 A similar problem to the one identified in the paragraph above the preceding one affects our interpretation of the significance levels of the coefficients of the regression equation. When the arbitrator selection hypothesis holds, both the coefficients in the equation and their standard errors should be 0.
Again a possible solution is to treat the ARBAWARD and JAWARD equations as being independent and then test whether their coefficients are identical rather than looking only at the jury award minus arbitration award results in Table 2 . Nevertheless, I just consider the results as reported in Table 2 , realizing that the t-statistics may overstate the differences.
Looking first at the individual coefficients for both equations, it is seen that the coefficients for RELNEG.MED and RNG.MED.DISP are not at all statistically significant from 0, that the coefficients for DCORP.RNG.MED and DC.RNG. MED.DISP are the most significantly different from 0, and that the intercept term is somewhere in between these two extremes of significance. The joint test that all 5 coefficients are equal to 0 can be rejected at the 9% level of significance for regression 5 but only at the 22% level for equation 6. 16 Clearly, in both regressions the significance levels are due to the different levels of response by juries and arbitrators to corporate defendants (as I had anticipated). The joint test that the first three coefficients (the intercept, RELNEG.MED and RNG.MED.DISP) are equal to 0 can only be rejected at the 16% and 42% level of significance for regressions 5 and 6, respectively.
The one area where there is a clear difference between juries and arbitrators is the percentage of plaintiff verdicts. As can be seen in Table 3 , arbitrators rule in favor of the plaintiff 98 percent of the time while juries rule in favor of the plaintiff 73 percent of the time. The arbitrator selection theory predicts that arbitrators are more likely than juries to split the 15 Unfortunately, this method ignores the fact that the individual jury and arbitration verdicts are related. Therefore, I also undertook a non-parametric test that counted the number of times JAWARD.MINUS.ARBAWARD was positive and negative. Under the null hypothesis these numbers should be the same. But they were not. JAWARD.MINUS.ARBAWARD was much more often negative than positive (we will come back to this point shortly). The hypothesis that they were the same could be rejected at .001 significance level.
difference and rule in favor of the plaintiff. For example, if a jury has a 50% chance of awarding $1000 and a 50% chance of ruling a defendant verdict, then the arbitrator will choose to award $500. 17 Splitting the difference reduces variance, which increases the probability of the arbitrator being chosen.
As already noted, the average JAWARD.MINUS.ARBAWARD equals -$3,295 With an average jury verdict of $19,227 and an average arbitration verdict of $22,521, arbitration verdicts are on average 17% higher than jury verdicts. This is not an insignificant economic difference, but it is probably not much larger, if at all, than the transaction costs of going to a jury trial.
The correlation between jury awards and arbitration awards is 74%. While clearly not 100%, this correlation is nonetheless very high. 18 The similarities between arbitrators and juries appear to be stronger than their differences.
We next consider the issue of consistency. Suppose that the coefficients of the estimated jury award and arbitration award equations are identical; it is still possible that the error variance of one of the two equations is much larger than the error variance of the other. Under reasonable assumptions, the higher variance would indicate less consistency. 19 In determining whether juries or arbitrators are more consistent, we will consider two choices for a metric: comparing the root mean-square errors of the jury and arbitrator award equations and comparing their Rsquares. Looking back at Table 1 , there appears to be little difference between arbitrators and juries in this regard --the jury equation has an R-square of .6446 and a root mean-squared error of 38,937 and the arbitration equation has an R-square of .6302 with a root mean-square error of 36,355. 20 17 Bloom and Cavanagh (1986) have argued that labor arbitrators tend "to split the difference" in order to look fair and continue being hired. Splitting the difference also accounts for the results in our non-parametric test. Arbitration verdicts are more often greater than their related jury verdict than the reverse because there are numerous cases where the jury awards nothing and the arbitrator awards something.
This data contradicts Bernstein (1996) who argues that juries are "a disaster for the civil justice system" because they "undermine certainty." Here, arbitrators are no more predictable than juries even though the arbitrator selection theory suggests that arbitrators are chosen with the trait of consistency in mind. If there were only arbitrators and no juries, the impetus for appointing consistent arbitrators would likely be lessened.
In a nutshell, with the exception of the deep pockets issue, the jury and arbitrator equations are very similar regarding both their coefficients and their sum of squared errors. And even on the deep pockets issue the coefficients are reasonably close in terms of size (if not statistically so).
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There has been a long and contentious debate about the relative merits of juries versus judges and legal professionals and there have been numerous empirical studies. The work here differs in two respects from previous work.
(1) I have data on cases that were actually tried by both a jury and an arbitrator. 21 Other studies compare one set of cases tried by judges and another set of cases tried by juries. The set of cases chosen are often quite dissimilar in terms of case category (e.g., there is a different mix of product liability and malpractice cases facing judges and juries). As Helland and Tabarrok (2000) have argued, a major explanation for the differences between juries and judges is due to the fact that they try different categories of cases. 22 Of course, in these studies judges and juries may try cases with greatly different characteristics even within categories.
(2) In my data, set arbitrators are chosen within the shadow of the jury. To the degree, that the arbitrator selection hypothesis is true, arbitrators and juries will have on average similar awards. This equivalence need not hold true if arbitration verdicts could not be retried by juries. 23 21 The classic work by Kalven and Zeisel (1966) asked judges what their decisions would have been if they had decided the case instead of the jury. See Hans and Vidmar (1991) for a review of the subsequent literature. . 22 See also Claremont and Eisenberg (1992) who show that differences between judge and jury vary by category. 23 Other studies have found similarites between judges and jurors. Eisenberg et. al. (2000) show that there is no substantive difference between judges and juries regarding the rate at which they award punitive damages or the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. A similar conclusion is reached by Robbennolt (2001) . Wissler et.al (1999) suveyed judges, lawyers and ordinary citizens on how they would have decided very short Econometrics is the art of the possible. One can always raise statistical questions about any econometric study. However, the relative richness of the data set 24 and the many results reported here should serve to increase our confidence in the data and the econometric models employed. The text reports two equations each with four coefficients (plus the intercept), and numerous other statistics. Nearly all of these coefficients are consistent with our prior expectations regarding sign and magnitude. Across equation results are also consistent with our prior expectations (the tests are not all statistically independent, however). These empirical results are robust to alternative estimating techniques and specifications of the model (see Appendix B and accompanying tables).
To summarize the main results: Both arbitrators and civil juries follow the broad outline of the law. Both award more to plaintiffs with greater medical damages and both award less where these damages are in dispute. The one area where both bend the intent of the law is when the defendant is a business or government entity. "Deep pockets" are emptied by juries and somewhat less so by arbitrators. These strong similarities between the jury and arbitration award equations help to corroborate the arbitrator selection hypothesis.
summaries of actual cases. They find considerable similarities between judges and "juries," but substantial differences between them and defense lawyers. 24 Many other data sets have no information on case characteristics such as damages suffered by the plaintiff or plaintiff recklessness, and some studies only have data on who won, but not on the size of the award.
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APPENDIX A A formal model of arbitrator selection
Let R be the expected jury award.
The litigants make informed predictions about the outcome of a trial. The generation of the litigants' expectations can be characterized by the following two equations: The litigants may have inconsistent estimates of R either because their observations cannot be credibly conveyed to the other party or because they have inconsistent priors.
Let C = C p + C d be the cost to the litigants of going to trial.
Suppose that the litigants are risk neutral and that the litigants will always settle if the differential in their expectations is less than or equal to the cost of going to court. Then the following conditions would be necessary and sufficient for a case going to trial:
25 A normal distribution is not required. It just makes the formula for Bayesian updating simpler. A negative R p would mean that the plaintiff expect to pay the defendant in a cross-complaint.
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Because of strategic bargaining and risk aversion (each working in the opposite direction), the above conditions are, in general, neither necessary nor sufficient. Therefore, we will assume the more general formulation that the probability of a trial (weakly) increases as the expectation differential, R p -R d = ω p -ω d , increases and that the probability of a trial is 0 when R p ≤ R d . 26 Since we are looking at cases that have gone through an arbitration trial, R p > R d .
B i is arbitrator i's percent bias in favor of the plaintiff, which is known by all of the litigants and the court administrator. 27 If arbitrator i is not biased, then B i = 0; if arbitrator i is biased against the plaintiff, then B i < 0. Let ARBAWARD i be the actual award by arbitrator i.
Where ζ i has a normal distribution with mean 0 and varianceσ i 2 . That is, arbitrator i's actual choice involves a random idiosyncratic component that is independent of the facts of the case and unobservable by the other parties (to make the analysis simpler, we will assume that ζ i is independent of ω p and ω d ). The second formula will be referred to as the arbitrator's implied estimate of the jury award.
The litigants update their estimates of the expected jury award after they learn ARBAWARD i . 28 That is, the litigants make use of the arbitration verdict in re-estimating the outcome of the jury trial.
The formula for updating is:
This latter assumption is not necessary, but it does simplify the proof.
27 A more complicated model could assume that the litigants are uncertain about the degree of bias. Such a consideration would add little to our understanding, but make the analysis unnecessarily complicated.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that B i = 0 for all i, but the variances differ across arbitrators, and this is common knowledge. Then the court administrators and litigants will want to choose those arbitrators with the smallest variances.
PROOF: Recall that for cases going to arbitration, R p > R d . For any given B, the lower the variance of the arbitrator, the greater the weight that the litigants will place on the arbitrator's implied estimate of the jury award and the closer their post-arbitration estimates of the jury trial will be. Therefore, the probability of a settlement will be higher. In particular, the lower the variance of the arbitrator's implied estimate, the greater the likelihood that the additional costs of a jury trial will outweigh the litigants' expectation differential. Therefore the litigants will be more likely to avoid a jury trial by either accepting the arbitration verdict or settling afterwards.
The litigant's would prefer to save on the cost of a trial and therefore other things being equal would choose to have a lower-variance arbitrator. The court administrator wants to minimize the number of jury trials; this is the rationale for setting up the arbitration system in the first place. Therefore, other things being equal, the court administrator will choose low-variance arbitrators.
q.e.d.
We next turn our attention toward the issue of bias. We will make the following additional assumptions.
If one side or the other does not accept the arbitration verdict, then the cost to each litigant of post-arbitration negotiation is .5C N If there is a settlement, S, we assume that a priori one side has no bargaining advantage so that on average S = (R p + R d )/2 pre-arbitration and S = (R +R )/2 post-arbitration (given an average arbitrator bias of 0).
If the post-arbitration negotiation is not successful, then the cost to each litigant of a jury trial is .5C T (that is, each side bears half the cost of a jury trial) unless the jury award is worse than the arbitration award for the side requesting a jury trial. In which case, the full cost is shifted to the requester. 0 < C N < C T .
PROPOSITION 2: Given arbitrators with equal variance, a litigant will choose an arbitrator that is not biased over an arbitrator that is biased against the litigant.
PROOF: First, if the case goes to jury trial, then the expected trial cost to the litigant will be less when the arbitrator is not biased against her. Sometimes, the litigant will pay for the other litigant's trial cost (when the litigant rejected the arbitration verdict but did worse with the jury trial), sometimes the other litigant will pay for her cost, while at other times each will share the burden, but on average, the cost of trial to each litigant will be .5 C T when the arbitrator is not biased. In contrast, when the arbitrator is biased against one of the litigants, call her A, then A's expected trial cost is greater than .5 C T because A is more likely to reject the arbitration verdict and be unlucky enough to have the jury award be worse than the arbitrator award than for the other litigant, call him B, to reject the arbitration verdict and be unlucky enough to have the jury award be worse than the arbitrator award from B's perspective. Even if the case does not get to jury trial, A will be at a disadvantage in the negotiations and thus be willing to settle for less than otherwise.
The second reason for preferring an unbiased arbitrator over a biased one is that post-arbitration trial costs will tend to be less. Despite the difference in bias, the arbitrators' decisions are equally as informative because their variances are the same. But the biased arbitrator's decision is more likely to be rejected because the biased arbitrator's verdict is less likely to fall within the parameters for acceptance by both parties. Costly post-arbitration negotiations will then have to be undertaken even if none would have been needed if the arbitrator's verdict were unbiased.
Hence each litigant will want to eliminate the arbitrator biased against the litigant in order to reduce the likelihood of unnecessary, but costly, post-arbitration negotiations, as well as to reduce the likelihood of paying more than her share of court costs if the case goes to jury trial. q.e.d.
Although the relative impact of these two propositions depends on the cost of a jury trial relative to the cost of negotiating a settlement after the arbitration verdict and on the variation in the size of the bias relative to the variation in arbitrator variance, I suspect that Proposition 1 is more powerful in practice. That is, high variance arbitrators will be eliminated more than biased arbitrators, because high-variance arbitrators do not aid the settlement process.
APPENDIX B RESULTS WHEN OTHER SAMPLES, EQUATION FORMS AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES ARE USED
Econometrics involves reasoned choices. However, not everyone will agree with my reasoning.
Hence, in this Appendix, I describe other possible specifications, argue for and against their use, and summarize the regression results.
DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF RELATIVE NEGLIGENCE
In the main part of the paper, relative negligence (RELNEG) was defined as defendant culpability/(defendant culpability + plaintiff culpability), where a value of 3 was ascribed to CULPABILITY for reckless driving, a value of 1 for appropriate driving, and a value of 2 for something in between. Now under comparative negligence, when the plaintiff is negligent and the defendant is not, the defendant is 0% liable, and when the defendant is negligent and the plaintiff is not, the defendant is 100% liable. One interpretation of this rule is that the defendant's relative negligence is 0 when DCULP = 1 and PCULP = 2 or 3, while RELNEG = 1 when DCULP = 2 or 3 and PCULP = 1 (otherwise, RELNEG conforms to the ratio defined earlier). I will call this the comparative negligence version of relative negligence. In comparison to the definition of RELNEG used in the main part of the paper, this measure loses information and therefore I expected the results to be less precise.
A simpler, but still less precise approach, is to set RELNEG = 1 when the defendant admits liability and RELNEG = .5 when the defendant does not admit liability.
Regressions using these alternative methods of measuring relative negligence are reported in Table B1 . As can be seen, with one statistically insignificant exception (the coefficient of RNG.MED.DISP for one of the arbitrator award equations), the results are similar in scale and sign to the results reported in Table 1 .
ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES
In the main body of the paper, I estimated the expected award equation directly and not as a product of its component parts (the probability of a plaintiff verdict and the award given a plaintiff verdict). I argued that under comparative negligence, greater relative negligence by the plaintiff reduces the award toward zero so there is no need to distinguish between a plaintiff verdict and a defendant verdict. A change from a defendant verdict to a plaintiff verdict would not change the award (it would be zero in either case).
(A) Award Given a Plaintiff Win
The estimated equations given a plaintiff win (Table B2 , columns 1 and 5) look very similar to our earlier estimates that are not conditioned on the plaintiff winning (Table 1) . Nevertheless, in this appendix, I will consider other statistical procedures for estimating the award which account for the probability of a plaintiff verdict.
Unfortunately, there is little consensus on the appropriate estimating technique, and all contenders have serious shortcomings.
Insight into the issues surrounding estimation is best gained by first considering negligence with contributory negligence. Under a system of negligence with contributory negligence (NCN), the plaintiff receives all or nothing at all. If the plaintiff is not negligent and the defendant is, then the verdict is in favor of the plaintiff and the award fully compensates the plaintiff for her damages; otherwise, the verdict is in favor of the defendant. One could legitimately restrict the sample to plaintiff wins and regress the award against the independent variables. If cases won by the defendant were reversed, this would not alter the estimated coefficients because there is no censoring of the dependent variable. Since the probability of a plaintiff verdict only depends on the litigants' levels of care and not on any of the variables effecting award (under NCN), the probability of a plaintiff verdict could be estimated independently. The estimated probability of winning would then be multiplied times the estimated award given a plaintiff win to generate the overall expected award.
Comparative negligence has a different configuration. Under comparative negligence, less care by the defendant increases the award given a plaintiff win. Thus, under comparative negligence, probability of a plaintiff win and the size of the award given a plaintiff win are not independent.
(B). Jointly Estimating Probability of Winning and the Award
In order to account for this joint dependence, I reformulated the equations as follows: The equations were estimated using seemingly unrelated regression. The results are reported in Table B2 columns 2 and 5. The coefficients are very similar to those obtained by considering only plaintiff wins (columns 1 and 4) and again are similar to the original estimates reported in Table 1 .
(C) Sample Selection into Plaintiff Wins
The award equation could be conceived as a sample selection into the set of cases where the plaintiff wins. There are two problems with this approach. One, this is not really a problem of censoring (in the conventional econometric sense); and two, the selection variable, probability of winning, is not really independent . Nevertheless, we have estimated the JAWARD and ARBAWARD equations (see Table B2 , columns 3 and 7) using the Heckit procedure. Letting J.P.VERDICT = 1 when the jury verdict is in favor of the plaintiff and J.P.VERDICT = 0, otherwise, I first ran a probit with J.P.VERDICT (or ARB.P.VERDICT) as the dependent variable and LIABAD as the independent variable. With the exception of the intercepts, the coefficients were quite similar to the coefficients in our other equations using different estimating techniques. In accordance with our argument, the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio were insignificantly different from 0.
(D) Tobit
Alternatively, one could employ a Tobit. There are problems with this approach, as well. The formulation assumes that the underlying variable can be negative which does not seem sensible in the context of litigation. 29 The estimated coefficients are reported in Table B2 , columns 4 and 8. With the exception of the intercept, the coefficients of the equations are again similar to our previous results.
DIFFERENT VARIABLES
Perhaps I have misspecified the true underlying equation. Redefining MED . DISP = MED . DISP + .5 and DCORP = DCORP + .5, the following is a reasonable alternative specification: The results are reported in Table B3 . As can be seen, our basic hypotheses are robust to this alternative specification. All of the coefficients have the correct sign except MED . DISP in the LN.JAWARD equation (but it is not at all significant). Again, juries empty deep pockets more than arbitrators do. Columns 2 and 6: Award and probability jointly estimated. other is the predicted log (plaintiff verdict + .001) for juries and for arbitrators. Residual is the residual from the arbitration award equation for the jury award equation and the residual from the jury award equation for the arbitration award equation.
Columns 3 and 7: The Heckman sample selection model (selection into plaintiff verdict): Other is the inverse Mills ratio.
Columns 4 and 8: Estimation using tobit. Other is sigma. 
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